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On 19 March 2018, the School of Transnational Governance and the 
Department of Law at the European University Institute organised a 
high-level policy dialogue on the possibility and the desirability of eco-
nomic sanctions against so-called defiant member states of the Euro-
pean Union (EU). The event gathered academics, policy-makers and 
elected officials for one day to discuss possible answers to the ongoing 
systemic threat to the fundamental values enshrined in Article 2 TEU 
one may see growing in some EU countries. The dialogue took place 
under Chatham House Rules. 
Speakers included professors in European affairs, constitutional law 
and comparative politics from various European and non-European 
universities. Representatives of some civil society groups, past or pre-
sent elected officials, and EU officials, also participated in the discus-
sion. 
 
Policy Brief author: Théo Fournier
Seminar convener: Gábor Halmai
The opinions of the authors represent personal opinions and do not represent 
the position or opinion of the European University Institute
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I. Background 
When EU member states ratified the Lisbon Treaty, they 
all agreed to respect the  fundamental values of the EU 
embodied in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU). These values are:




• The rule of law ;
• Respect for human rights and minority rights
Despite this commitment, some member states have 
openly and repeatedly violated Article 2. What may be 
labelled democratic and rule of law backsliding represents 
one of the most serious threats currently faced by the EU.
Regarding the non-respect of European values, Hun-
gary and Poland are among the most concerning cases. 
Since 2011, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party has repeatedly 
infringed minority rights, freedom of expression and 
independence of the judiciary. Fidesz continues to enjoy 
strong popular support, confirmed by the general elec-
tion in April which gave it a two-third majority in the 
parliament (although it is important to note that these 
elections have taken place within a seriously compro-
mised electoral framework, with the OSCE for instance 
concluding that the 2014 elections were free but not fair). 
In Poland, the victory of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
in 2016 marked the beginning of a series of violations 
of European values. These violations have been coupled 
with a manipulation of the Polish constitutional order 
and ongoing attempts to capture the whole judiciary, the 
Constitution Tribunal having been captured in December 
2016. 
The two countries (often labelled, rightly or wrongly, as 
“illiberal democracies”) are characterised by a reduction 
of democracy to the rule of majority as interpreted by the 
ruling party and its Great Leader, a devaluation of the 
rule of law and a systemic suppression of various forms 
of pluralism. 
Because of the seriousness of the violations, the EU had 
to react but its various reactions were both fragile and 
unbalanced. Fragile first because of the current legal 
framework symbolised by the so-called “nuclear option” 
of article 7 TEU. 
Although Article 7 TEU was, in reality, written with the 
hope it would never have to be activated, it nevertheless 
remains the sole Treaty based instrument specifically 
designed to prevent serious violations of European values. 
Unbalanced also because the EU Commission only acti-
vated Article 7 procedure against Poland, whereas the 
situation in Hungary may be viewed as more problem-
atic than the one in Poland. The main explanation is, 
seemingly, political opportunism. Fidesz is indeed part of 
the European People’s Party – the majoritarian political 
group at the European Parliament (EP) – which is not the 
case for PiS. 
The question of how to conciliate effective action within 
a limited legal framework and a highly sensitive polit-
ical spectrum was at the core of the one-day roundtable. 
The participants presented and tested different possible 
actions against the defiant member states with a partic-
ular focus on economic sanctions. They also discussed:
• The legal basis of these economic sanctions;
• The possibility of concrete political actions;
• Potential remedies to the crisis 
▶How to conciliate effective 
action within a limited 
legal framework and a highly 
sensitive political situation 
▶ So far, the EU’s reaction has 
been fragile and unbalanced 
TAKE 
AWAY
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II. Introduction
Preliminary talks first focused on the possible actions 
outside the framework of Article 7. Even though article 7 
has been triggered against Poland, a successful outcome 
from a rule of law point of view remains highly uncertain. 
The acknowledgement of a “serious threat to European 
values” – article 7(1) –  has, for instance, to be accepted 
by 4/5 of the Council and there will be most probably an 
opposition from the Baltic States. The adoption of sanc-
tions – article 7(2) – must be unanimously agreed. With 
more than one “illiberal” regime in the EU, this appears 
virtually impossible.
Actions could be broadened in three directions:
1. Imposition of financial sanctions
2. Cutting the access of specific EU funds
3. Adoption of a conditionality clause
First the systemic violation of European values could be 
considered an infringement of European law per se. The 
activation of an infringement proceeding could open the 
way to a ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
If the ruling of the Court is not respected by the govern-
ment of the country having gone rogue, then the ECJ 
could fine the state based on article 260 TFEU. In other 
words, the infringement proceeding could lead to the 
imposition of financial sanctions on the basis of Article 
2 TEU. 
The second option is also a financial one since it consists 
of  cutting the access of specific EU funds in case of vio-
lation of EU fundamental values. The third option is not 
a sanction but it may still carry financial consequences. 
The idea would be to use the renegotiation of the 2021 EU 
budget to adopt a conditionality clause, which would make 
continuing access to EU funding contingent on respect 
for Article 2 TEU. Whatever the solution(s) adopted, the 
first discussant concluded that policy-makers must bear 
in mind that financial sanctions can be damaging to the 
citizens of the defiant states. 
The impact of three recent rulings were then discussed 
to see if they may open new avenues to sanction rule 
of law backslidings. The first decision is an order of the 
ECJ Court issued on 20 November 2017 which ordered 
Poland to immediately cease its “forest management 
operations” in a Natura 2000 site failing what it may be 
subject to pay a penalty of at least €100,000 per day.  What 
is particularly noteworthy according to the discussant is 
the fact that this ruling is based on a purposive, expan-
sive interpretation of Article 279 TFEU – ECJ power to 
impose interim measures in order to ensure that its judg-
ments are fully effective – which is justified on the basis 
of the principle of the rule of law. 
The second decision is a ground-breaking ECJ judge-
ment issued on 27 February 2018.  The ECJ ruled that 
maintaining national courts or tribunals’ independence 
is essential and inherent in the task of adjudication and 
made clear that Member States have a duty to maintain 
the independence of their national courts and, more 
broadly, to ensure that their courts meet the requirements 
essential to effective judicial protection. 
According to the discussant, this essentially means that 
direct attacks on national courts and judges can now be 
directly challenged on the basis of EU law and, more spe-
cifically, Article 19(1) TEU. 
The third and last decision is an important and unprece-
dented judgement adopted on 12 March 2018 by the Irish 
High Court.  The Court decided that the cumulative effect 
of rule of law violations in Poland have reached such a 
Possible responses:
▶Imposition of financial 
sanctions on the basis of 
Article 2 TEU
▶ Cutting the access of 
specific EU funds
▶ Renegotiation of the 
2021 EU budget to adopt a 
conditionality clause, which 
would make continued access 
to EU funding contingent on 
respect for Article 2 TEU
TAKE 
AWAY
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level that the ECJ must now decide whether the EU prin-
ciples of mutual trust and mutual recognition ought to be 
set aside. Similar judgements could be adopted by other 
national courts and could create a climate of mutual defi-
ance against the Polish and Hungarian justice systems. 
III. Discussion
Based on the preliminary remarks, the discussion was 
articulated around three questions: 
1. The conditionality dimension: how to assess a viola-
tion of the European values in practice?
2. The sanction dimension: what should be the nature 
of the sanctions and what are their limits?
3. The rollback dimension: which strategy to adopt in 
order to end and roll back the capture of checks and 
balances? 
The conditionality dimension
Answering the question of conditionality is essential 
because it brings the discussion back to the Copenhagen 
criteria. Participants agreed to say that pre-enlargement 
and post accession compliance with these criteria was not 
taken as seriously as others such as the Maastricht ones. 
The EU has functioned for too long without seeking to 
clearly formalise a common understanding of what Euro-
pean values are about. This lack of genuine self-reflection 
on the values was slightly corrected by some a posteriori 
initiatives. One participant, for example, observed that 
article 7 was introduced in order to counterbalance the 
weaknesses of the Copenhagen criteria. 
The adoption by the European Commission of the rule 
of law framework in 2014 may be seen as evidence that 
a consensus on European values could emerge. While 
regretting that the framework was adopted after article 
2 had been substantially and systematically violated in at 
least one EU Member State, the participants agreed that 
the framework could be used again in the framing of 
future European policies. 
One area could be the EU’s multiannual financial frame-
work. Conditionality may also bring objectivity in the 
debate and may prevent double standards. Some partici-
pants however criticised the rigidity of rule of law criteria 
claiming that no member states would always fully respect 
all of them. The Commission’s rule of law framework or 
Article 7 TEU are however there to deal with exceptional 
situations rather than to address minor, non-systemic, 
non-serious threats or breaches of the rule of law. 
Conditionality and common agreement on the Euro-
pean values are essential but so is a common strategy 
regarding the institution in charge of monitoring and 
establishing any eventual violation of European values. 
For instance, the European Commission enjoys full dis-
cretion regarding the activation (or not) of the Rule of 
Law Framework. 
This may be seen as problematic because it may politi-
cise the debate. In that sense, the discussants acknowl-
edged that the involvement of national courts could be an 
interesting solution but it would not come without limits. 
First Polish and Hungarian courts have been or are in the 
process of being “captured”, which means that internal 
judicial “resistance” is unlikely in these countries. For 
instance, the likelihood of a preliminary question to the 
ECJ on issues of judicial independence is low. 
The alternative of using other national courts to collec-
tively assess violation of Article 2 in another country is 
another possibility.  However, it requires coordinated 
action, a selection of test cases involving European law 
and the assurance that individual judges will act in the 
same direction. Moreover, it has been underlined that the 
overall message “we do not trust your judges anymore” is 
problematic. It could encourage business actors to turn to 
arbitration, which may be viewed as a process that suffers 
from a number of flaws from a rule-of-law point of view. 
The sanction dimension
The recourse to financial sanctions was then widely dis-
cussed, especially the linkage between conditionality and 
economic sanctions. Some have argued that this linkage 
already exists in the area of EU external relations and that 
a similar linkage could or should be envisaged for internal 
policies. Economic sanctions must however be carefully 
thought and contextualised before being applied. A fine 
or a suspension of EU funds should be designed so as to 
not to affect the population who cannot be held respon-
sible for the violations of European values by their gov-
ernments. This would also prevent any “rally-around-
the-flag” campaigns by the targeted governments. This 
may however tempt rogue governments to court non-EU 
authoritarian powers. 
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Instead of direct economic sanctions, some participants 
advocated for indirect economic sanctions or direct eco-
nomic incentives. The EU could, for example, put more 
emphasis on the connection between respect of European 
values and safeguard of external investments. Another 
option could be to provide direct financial support to 
civil society actors. The proposal to set up a European 
Values Instrument may be viewed in this respect as a pos-
itive step.  
If economic actions are triggered, the particular economic 
context of Poland and Hungary ought to be taken into 
account. If the illiberal path the two countries follow is 
broadly similar, their motivation is different. Considering 
the features of Orban’s regime, financial sanctions may 
indeed have an impact if they target the right persons. In 
Poland, however, financial sanctions may not work con-
sidering the more ideology-driven nature of the ongoing 
process of constitutional capture we are witnessing there. 
The way forward
A genuine reflection is also needed for stronger political 
actions. The constant support of EPP leaders towards 
Orban’s policies may be viewed as unwise if not shameful. 
Political pressure and even shaming strategy could be 
used in the forthcoming of the 2019 European elec-
tions so as to prevent authoritarian forces hiding behind 
mainstream allegedly pro-European parties while imple-
menting actions and policies which are in obvious breach 
of Article 2. 
More largely, a coordination of the different EU insti-
tutions is needed to ensure that European values are 
respected. This must come with full transparency when-
ever a decision to act – or not to act – against a defiant 
government is taken. Finally, more radical options such as 
a two-speed Europe or a suspension of Schengen should 
be considered notwithstanding their high political costs. 
Within the defiant states, EU actors should reflect on how 
best communicate the importance of the values laid down 
in Article 2 and counteract anti-EU narratives promoted 
by the “illiberal” governments which however receive 
substantial EU funding. 
A new narrative about the rule of law must be put 
together and promoted. The EU should strongly support 
civil society actors but also judges in countries where the 
independence of the judiciary is under attack. A discus-
sant suggested to work on a European news channel in 
order to reach out directly the population without going 
through captured national media. 
IV. Concluding Remarks
The final round of the debate was dedicated to the con-
crete actions the participants could take in order to help 
national judiciaries in countries where their indepen-
dence is attacked. Numerous initiatives involving dif-
ferent actors in different domains were discussed such as:
• A strategic litigation strategy; 
• A strategic litigation fund; 
• Targeted communications to key actors so that they 
become more familiar with the nature of the threats 
to the rule  of law we are witnessing; 
▶ Which actor: could natonal 
courts play a role in 
monitoring and establishing 
any eventual violation of 
European values, instead of 
this being the sole discretion 
of the Commission?
▶ Which method: indirect 
economic sanctions or 
direct economic incentives 
(rather than direct economic 
sanctions?)
▶ How can the EU effectively 
communicate its own values and 
counteract anti EU narratives? 
TAKE 
AWAY
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• The need for the rapid publication of counter-ar-
guments when authoritarian governments justify 
attacks on the rule of law on the basis of misleading 
legal analysis 
It was emphasised that the actions cannot be limited to a 
top-down approach and they must reach out the people. 
Engagement of civil society can have a direct impact on 
the political. In this perspective, it was suggested that 
many networks could be used, such as the European 
ombudsman. 
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